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TAKING A GAMBLE ON PUBLIC MORALS: 
INVOKING THE ARTICLE XIV  
EXCEPTION TO GATS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n July 31, 2001, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals handed 
down a decision against Jay Cohen1 that became the basis of a 
landmark trade dispute against the United States in the World Trade Or-
ganization (“WTO”). Jay Cohen is an American citizen who moved to 
the tiny Caribbean twin island nation of Antigua and Barbuda (“Anti-
gua”)2 to establish the World Sports Exchange, an internet and telephone 
based gambling business directed at customers in the United States.3 Af-
ter being convicted of violating the Wire Communications Act4 for oper-
ating this gambling service, Cohen found an ally in his adopted home, 
Antigua. Claiming that the United States was violating the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”),5 Antigua brought the issue 
                                                                                                             
 1. See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district 
court’s conviction and twenty-one month imprisonment sentence of Cohen for facilitation 
of offshore gambling activities). 
 2. See CIA World Factbook, Antigua and Barbuda, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ ac.html. 
 3. Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70.  
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). The statute states, in pertinent part, the following: 
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly 
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign 
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire com-
munication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of 
bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; 
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in in-
terstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sport-
ing events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the 
placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign 
country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or 
foreign country in which such betting is legal. 
Id. 
 5. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
O 
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to the WTO in a case that was characterized by referral to the biblical 
battle between David and Goliath.6 
Initially, an adjudicatory panel established by the WTO’s Dispute Set-
tlement Body issued a Report ruling in favor of Antigua.7 However, on 
appeal the Panel’s holding was subsequently reversed by the Appellate 
Body based on the argument by the United States that it has the right to 
prohibit internet gambling services.8 The United States claimed that this 
right exists under the general exceptions clause, Article XIV of the 
GATS, which allows Members to implement measures that protect pub-
lic morals and order, even if the measures violate the GATS.9 Part II of 
this Note will discuss in detail the background of this dispute, the claims 
made by Antigua, the defense asserted by the United States, and the rul-
ings of the Panel and Appellate Body. 
Part III of this Note will specifically focus on the analyses employed 
by the Panel and the Appellate Body in determining whether the United 
States’ measures prohibiting internet gambling services fell within the 
protection of Article XIV of the GATS. Although the methods of the 
Panel and Appellate Body were largely parallel, they diverged on the 
crucial issue of burden of proof.10 In its ruling, the Panel reproved the 
United States for not having thoroughly investigated WTO-consistent 
alternatives to its violating measures, and found that the United States 
thus did not meet its burden of proof.11 The Appellate Body, however, 
                                                                                                             
 6. See, e.g., James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-Border Gambling and Betting: 
The WTO Dispute Between Antigua and the United States, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
0013, Abstract (2004), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0013.html; 
Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade 
Against Moral Values, THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., Nov. 2004, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/11/ insight041117.html; Ellen Gould, The US-
Gambling Decision: A Wakeup Call for WTO Members, CAN. CTR. FOR POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES, Trade and Investment Series Vol. 5 No. 4 (2004); WTO Rules Against US 
Gambling Ban, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/4001793.stm. 
 7. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Internet 
Gambling Panel Report]. 
 8. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report]. 
 9. Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS285, Key Facts and Summary of the Dispute to 
Date United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Bet-
ting Services, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last 
visited May 17, 2007) [hereinafter Key Facts and Summary]. 
 10. Id.; see also Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 11. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
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found that the failure of the United States to research or offer substitute 
measures did not bar it from satisfying its burden of proof, and accepted 
the Article XIV defense.12 
Part IV of this Note will examine the issue of burden of proof in the 
use of the Article XIV defense by comparing the findings of the Panel 
and the Appellate Body with prior uses of similar defenses in WTO dis-
putes. Finally, Part V of this Note will argue that, once a party’s meas-
ures are found to be in violation of a WTO agreement, it is that party’s 
burden to show that the measures at issue satisfy the requirements of a 
general exceptions clause. This is a high burden requiring, among other 
things, that the violating measures are necessary for the protection of 
public morals or order.13 Contrary to the decision of the Appellate Body, 
Part V of this Note will conclude that the Panel was correct in originally 
rejecting the defense argued by the United States.14 The United States did 
not have a valid claim for taking exception to its trade obligations by 
prohibiting trade in the service of cross-border remote gambling without 
seeking in good faith WTO-consistent alternate measures.15 The United 
States had the burden to show that its prohibitions met the requirements 
of Article XIV, and it did not meet that burden. Part V of this Note will 
also contend that the holding of the Appellate Body that a Member such 
as the United States could implement measures that violate the GATS 
without having sought WTO-consistent alternative measures to meet its 
policy goals undermines the integrity of the heavily-negotiated trade 
agreements and the overall goal of the WTO to liberalize trade.16 
II. CLAIM BY ANTIGUA AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
Antigua, one of the smallest nations in the world with a population of 
only 68,108,17 is a base for many international internet gambling opera-
tions. Its economy is largely connected to trade in this service,18 which 
                                                                                                             
 12. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 13. GATS, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1167, art. XIV. 
 14. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law, A Center for International Environmental Law Issue 
Brief For the World Summit on Sustainable Development 26 August – 4 September 
2002: WTO Negotiations to Liberalize Trade in Services: New Challenges for Sustain-
able Development (2002), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/services.pdf. 
 17. CIA World Factbook, supra note 2. 
 18. Thayer, supra note 6. In an attempt to diversify its economy from reliance on 
sugar and tourism, Antigua developed an infrastructure to support internet based gam-
bling and betting services. By 1999, three thousand people were employed by the gam-
bling and betting industry in Antigua and the government was receiving over $7.4 million 
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has helped Antigua weather downturns in its sugar and tourism sectors.19 
Recently, however, Antigua’s gambling and betting services industry 
suffered a drastic decline 20 for which it specifically blamed U.S. prohibi-
tions and market access restrictions on cross-border gambling services.21 
In March of 2003, Antigua requested consultations with the United 
States regarding measures applied by U.S. central, regional and local au-
thorities which made illegal the cross-border supply of gambling and 
betting services.22 Antigua argued that these prohibitive measures consti-
tuted an infringement of the obligations of the United States under the 
GATS Articles II, VI, VIII, XI, XVI, and XVII,23 and the U.S. Schedule 
of Specific Commitments annexed to the GATS.24 
The GATS consists of general principles which govern trade in ser-
vices among WTO Members and regulate the specific commitments that 
each Member assigns to it.25 Under the GATS, Members are required to 
establish “schedules of specific commitments” listing their terms of trade 
for various services.26 Members decide which services to commit to the 
provisions of the agreement and what limitations they want to place on 
the commitment of that service.27 This list of commitments makes up the 
GATS Schedule of the Members, which is then annexed to the GATS.28 
                                                                                                             
annually from the licensing fees of 119 internet gambling and betting operations, which 
accounted for over ten percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. Id. 
 19. WTO Rules Against US Gambling Ban, supra note 6; Thayer, supra note 6. 
 20. Thayer, supra note 6. From 1999 to 2003, at least thirty-five banks licensed in 
Antigua closed, the number of licensed gambling and betting operations decreased over 
710%, the number of people employed in the industry decreased 750%, and the govern-
ment licensing fees decreased over 410%. Id. 
 21. Id. Specifically, Antigua contended that the economic downturn in its gambling 
and betting services industry was a direct result of (1) the U.S. Internet Gambling En-
forcement Act, H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2002); (2) the self-regulation of the credit card 
industry in the United States; and (3) the Second Circuit ruling against Jay Cohen (refer-
ring to Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70). Id. 
 22. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1 (Mar. 
27, 2003). 
 23. GATS, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1167. These Articles refer to the following: 
Article II: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment; Article VI: Domestic Regulation; Article 
VIII: Monopolies and Exclusive Service Providers; Article XI: Payments and Transfers; 
Article XVI: Market Access; Article XVII: National Treatment. 
 24. U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, With Explanatory Materials Prepared by the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission under Investigation No. 332-354, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (May 1997). 
 25. See Thayer, supra note 6. 
 26. GATS, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1167, art. XX:1. 
 27. Gould, supra note 6, at 3. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
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Within the context of its own schedule, each Member must allow market 
access to foreign service providers and treat foreign service providers in 
a manner no less favorable than its own domestic suppliers of like ser-
vices.29 
After its consultations with the United States failed, on June 12, 2003, 
Antigua requested that the WTO establish an adjudicatory panel to re-
solve its allegations that the United States was acting in contravention to 
its GATS obligations. Antigua’s two major complaints were that: 1) 
while U.S. authorities allow numerous U.S. operators to offer various 
gambling and betting services within the United States, there is no possi-
bility for foreign operators to obtain authorization to supply gambling 
and betting services from outside the United States; and 2) the U.S. au-
thorities restrict international transfers and payments related to gambling 
and betting services offered from outside the United States.30 
A. WTO Panel Report Ruling in Favor of Antigua 
The success of Antigua’s case first depended on whether the WTO 
would interpret U.S. commitments in the GATS to include gambling ser-
vices.31 In its schedule to the GATS, the United States had agreed not to 
restrict the importation of “recreational services.”32 While Antigua con-
strued this clause to allow the free flow of cross-border gambling ser-
vices, the United States maintained that it had never intended that inter-
pretation.33 As evidence of its position concerning its commitments, the 
United States pointed to the explicit exclusion of sporting services from 
its commitment schedule, which, according to the United States, encom-
passed betting on sports.34 Moreover, the United States argued that the 
existence of domestic prohibitions against internet gambling35 further 
proved that it never intended to include such activity in the trade agree-
ment. According to the United States, its prohibition represented “vital 
policy objectives” rendering it “incomprehensible for the United States 
to make [gambling services] the subject of a specific commitment.”36 
                                                                                                             
 29. Thayer, supra note 6. 
 30. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United 
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/2 (June 13, 2003). 
 31. Gould, supra note 6, at 4. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 35. Pauwelyn, supra note 6. 
 36. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
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On the issue of whether the United States commitments included inter-
net gambling services, the November 10, 2004 WTO Panel ruling37 ap-
plied the rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention38 and sided 
with Antigua, holding that gambling services were indeed covered under 
the GATS category “recreational services” and were not a sporting ser-
vice.39 The Panel further found that because various U.S. federal and 
state laws contained restrictions on gambling services, the United States 
was failing to offer Antigua’s gambling service suppliers the proper 
treatment as set out under its GATS Schedule of Commitments.40 Spe-
cifically, the Panel Report examined the Federal Wire Act,41 Travel 
Act,42 and Illegal Gambling Business Act,43 and the state laws of Colo-
rado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
South Dakota, and Utah that restrict or prohibit gambling.44 After this 
review, the Panel concluded that all three federal laws and the state laws 
of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah violated the spe-
cific market access commitments of the United States for gambling and 
betting services under the GATS Article XVI.45 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. 
 38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31.1, 31.2, 31.3 
and 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In 
applying the Vienna Convention, the Panel looked to literal dictionary definitions for 
insight on “ordinary meaning” under Vienna Convention Article 31.1, as well as looking 
to other WTO documents as “context,” “subsequent practice,” or “supplementary means 
of interpretation” under Vienna Convention Articles 31.2, 31.3, and 32, respectively. 
Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 39. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 40. WTO Panel Rules in Favour of Antigua, Barbuda in Gambling Dispute, INT’L 
CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS 
DIGEST, Vol. 8, No. 39, Nov. 17, 2004. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (prohibiting gambling business from knowingly receiv-
ing or sending certain types of bets or information that assist in placing bets over inter-
state and international wires). 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961) (imposing criminal penalties for those who utilize inter-
state or foreign commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activ-
ity, including unlawful gambling). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (criminalizing under certain conditions the operation of a 
gambling business that violates the law of the state where the gambling takes place). 
 44. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-10-103; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (1968); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 271 § 17A (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.755, Subdivisions 2–3 
(1963) and 609.755(1) (1963); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2A:40-1; 
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; GEN. OBLIG. § 5-401; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-25A-1–22-25A-
15 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (1973). 
 45. Key Facts and Summary, supra note 9. However, the Panel decided that the 
measures at issue did not violate the domestic regulation provisions of the GATS Article 
VI, and did not rule as to Antigua’s claims concerning payments and transfers provisions 
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In its defense the United States was forced to rely on the invocation of 
the never-before used GATS Article XIV exception provision for protec-
tion of public morals or public order, or for securing compliance with 
U.S. laws or regulations.46 The United States depended heavily on this 
Article XIV exception in order to win its case. Specifically, the United 
States argued for protection under XIV(a) by claiming that the Wire Act, 
the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are necessary to 
protect “public morals” and “public order” within the meaning of Article 
XIV(a) because of the heightened risks that remote gambling posed to 
society. 47 The United States presented evidence demonstrating that mi-
nors could too easily access internet gambling sites,48 and argued that the 
                                                                                                             
of GATS Article XI or national treatment provisions of GATS Article XVII for the sake 
of judicial economy. Id. 
 46. Id. Article XIV of the GATS provides, in relevant part, that: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order (Footnote 5: 
The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and suffi-
ciently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society);   
. . .  
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not in-
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: 
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal 
with the effects of a default on services contracts; 
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the proc-
essing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confi-
dentiality of individual records and accounts; 
(iii) safety; . . .  
GATS, supra note 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1167, Art. XIV. 
 47. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 48. Id. (citing Amit Asaravala, Why Online Age Checks Don’t Work, WIRED NEWS, 
Oct. 10, 2002). Also, the Panel referred to a quote by the Senior Vice President for Public 
Policy of Visa U.S.A. in his testimony before the Commission on Online Protection in 
2000 where he stated that 
[T]he [Child Online Protection] Act basically assumes that only adults have ac-
cess to a credit card or debit card. To the contrary…[a]ccess to a credit card or 
a debit card is not a good proxy for age. The mere fact that a person uses a 
credit card or a debit card in connection with a transaction does not mean that 
this person is an adult. 
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sites were vulnerable to use by organized crime for laundering money.49 
In response, Antigua questioned the validity of the argument by the 
United States for the protection of public morals and public order on the 
bases that the United States is itself a significant consumer of gambling 
and betting services and that state-sanctioned gambling opportunities are 
available in forty-eight states.50 
Furthermore, regarding its defense under Article XIV(c), the United 
States argued that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act serve as law enforcement tools to secure compliance with 
other WTO-consistent U.S. laws, in particular, state gambling laws and 
criminal laws relating to organized crime.51 As to this defense, Antigua 
responded that the United States did not meet its burden to provide suffi-
cient information on the laws upon which it relied for the defense.52 In 
rebuttal, the United States stated that Members’ legislation is presumed 
to be WTO-consistent, including all legislation invoked by the United 
States in support of its Article XIV defense.53 
The Panel applied a two-tiered test to evaluate the Article XIV defense. 
Thus, in order for the United States to successfully claim protection un-
der this exception, the Panel would first have to find that its measures 
were necessary to protect public morals or public order, or to secure 
compliance with its laws.54 Second, the measures must not have been 
                                                                                                             
Mark MacCarthy, Senior Vice President for Pub. Policy, Visa U.S.A., Testimony Before 
the Commission on Online Protection (June 9, 2000). 
 49. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 50. Id. In its first submission to the WTO Panel, Antigua claimed that “[t]he United 
States is the world’s largest consumer of gambling and betting services, with a massive 
domestic industry responsible for generating gross revenues of approximately US $68.7 
billion in 2002.” First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States — Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Oct. 8, 
2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/pdf/Antigua_ 
FirstSubmission_ExecutiveSummary .pdf (citing Joe Weintert, U.S. Gambling Losses Hit 
$68.7B. Last Year, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (N.J.), Aug. 17, 2003, at G3). Among the 
estimated 1800 internet gambling operations currently in existence globally, up to 70% of 
all bets come from within the United States. Megan E. Frese, Rolling the Dice: Are 
Online Gambling Advertisers “Aiding and Abetting” Criminal Activity or Exercising 
First Amendment-Protected Commercial Speech?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 547, 549–50 (2005). 
 51. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily, as required by the chapeau, or in-
troductory provision of Article XIV.55   
Ultimately, the finding of the Panel against the United States in this 
case hinged on its ruling that the United States did not successfully meet 
the requirements to invoke an Article XIV defense. The Panel held that, 
because the United States did not sufficiently seek alternate measures 
that would meet U.S. policy objectives without violating its GATS com-
mitments, it did not meet its burden to prove that its measures at issue 
were “necessary” under Article XIV(a).56 
Further, as for the exception claimed by the United States under Article 
XIV(c), the Panel went through the same pattern of analysis as it did for 
Article XIV(a), and reached the same conclusions.57 Specifically, the 
Panel held that while the interest protected by the disputed statutes are 
important and make a significant contribution to enforcing criminal laws 
relating to organized crime, the measures have a significant impact on 
trade.58 The United States was thus at fault for its failure to explore and 
exhaust WTO-consistent alternatives by consulting and/or negotiating to 
determine whether there was a way to address its concerns in a WTO-
consistent manner.59 
This finding that the United States inadequately sought WTO-
consistent alternatives effectively defeated the defense claimed by the 
United States in this dispute. Nevertheless, the Panel moved to the sec-
ond tier of analysis in the provision, the introductory provisions of Arti-
cle XIV, the so-called chapeau, by considering Antigua’s other claims 
against the United States.60 The Panel found that the United States may 
be applying its measures in a way that violates the requirement in the 
chapeau to Article XIV of the GATS that “measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where like conditions prevail.”61 The 
Panel based this conclusion on evidence that inconsistent U.S. enforce-
ment efforts benefited U.S.-based suppliers of gambling services in that 
foreign suppliers were more often the targets of prosecution than U.S.-
based suppliers.62 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Key Facts and Summary, supra note 9. 
 62. Pauwelyn, supra note 6. 
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The ruling of the Panel was a major triumph for Antigua, yet there 
were serious doubts as to whether Antigua could garner enough strength 
to enforce the decision, and whether the ruling would survive appeal by 
the United States.63 Further dampening Antigua’s victory, the United 
States suggested it would refuse to accept the WTO ruling or to adjust its 
laws to conform to that ruling.64 In fact, the United States went so far as 
to threaten to activate its right to change the terms under which it joined 
the WTO in the first place.65 As expected, the United States did appeal 
the Panel ruling on January 7, 2005.66 
B. U.S. Victory in the WTO Appellate Body Ruling 
On April 7, 2005 the Appellate Body of the WTO handed down its 
noteworthy decision regarding Antigua’s dispute, reversing the Panel’s 
decision against the United States.67 The Appellate Body affirmed the 
Panel’s finding that the U.S. Schedule under the GATS did indeed in-
clude a commitment to grant full market access in gambling and betting 
services, though the Appellate Body relied on different instruments to 
come to this conclusion than did the Panel.68 Next, the Appellate Body 
                                                                                                             
 63. US-Antigua Gambling Dispute Raises Systemic Issues, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Vol. 8, No. 40, 
Nov. 24, 2004. 
 64. Id. 
 65. WTO Rules Against US Gambling Ban, supra note 6. 
 66. Notification of Appeal by the United States, United States—Measures Affecting 
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/6 (Jan. 7, 2005). 
 67. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. The Appellate Body’s 
ruling in favor of the United States was in fact a largely expected outcome. Joost Pauwe-
lyn, WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but Confirms 
Broad Reach into Sensitive Domestic Regulation, THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., Apr. 2005, 
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/ insights050412.html. 
 68. Key Facts and Summary, supra note 9. Specifically, the Appellate Body disagreed 
with the Panel’s use of some dictionaries’ inclusion of “gambling” or “betting” in their 
definitions of “sporting,” “recreational services,” and “entertainment” in order to conduct 
an “ordinary meaning” interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Id. The 
Appellate Body also disapproved of the Panel’s reliance on a GATS Services Sectoral 
Classification List and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1993 Scheduling 
Guidelines for an Article 31 context based interpretation because these documents were 
not agreements relating to the GATS that were accepted by the parties as binding. Id. 
Instead, the Appellate Body sought context in the United States’ Schedule as a whole and 
the structure of the GATS itself. Id. Comparing the United States’ Schedule with those of 
other Members, the Appellate Body noted that unlike the United States, other Members 
had explicitly committed or excluded gambling and betting services. Id. Also, there were 
no other examples where the category of “sporting services” clearly included gambling 
and betting services. Id. Finding this inconclusive, the Appellate Body then turned to an 
Article 32 means of interpretation, namely by using the GATS Services Sectoral Classifi-
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upheld the finding by the Panel that the federal Wire Act, Travel Act and 
Illegal Gambling Business Act violated the GATS market access obliga-
tions under Article XVI, though it reversed the Panel’s finding of GATS 
violations in the state laws of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, 
and Utah because of Antigua’s inability to establish a prima facie case on 
that issue.69 
The Appellate Body proceeded by conducting a substantive review of 
the Article XIV defense claimed by the United States.70 In examining the 
Panel’s analysis of Article XIV(a), the Appellate Body upheld the find-
ing of the Panel that the federal Wire Act, Travel Act, and Illegal Gam-
bling Business Act were designed to protect public morals.71 The Appel-
late Body also considered the alleged discriminatory application of the 
U.S. federal statutes by reviewing the Panel’s finding that the United 
States had not prosecuted certain domestic remote gambling service pro-
viders and that the U.S. Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”)72 may allow 
remote betting within the United States.73 However, on this issue of dis-
criminatory application, the Appellate Body reversed the ruling of the 
Panel that the United States did not satisfy the chapeau of Article XIV.74 
The Appellate Body then made a crucial departure from the Panel by 
finding that the measures at issue were necessary, without requiring the 
United States to have sought WTO-consistent alternatives.75 Thus, the 
Appellate Body reversed the ultimate finding of the Panel against the 
                                                                                                             
cation List and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1993 Scheduling Guidelines 
as relevant “preparatory work”. Id. Within these documents the Appellate Body found 
sufficient evidence that the United States’ GATS commitments include gambling and 
betting services. Id. 
 69. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. The Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”) allows an off-track betting system to 
accept interstate off-track wagers via telephone or other electronic media in the same or 
another state with respect to a horserace. 15 U.S.C. § 3002 (1978). 
 73. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 74. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. Although the Appellate 
Body upheld the finding of the Panel regarding the discriminatory nature of the IHA, the 
Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel regarding the enforcement of the other three 
federal statutes. Id. Because these statutes were facially neutral, the Panel looked to evi-
dence of discriminatory application, which consisted of five cases: one case of prosecu-
tion against a foreign service supplier, one case of pending prosecution against a domes-
tic supplier and three cases of no prosecution against domestic suppliers. Id. The Appel-
late Body viewed these cases as “isolated instances of enforcement” that did not merit 
dependence by the Panel. Id. 
 75. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8; Internet Gambling Panel 
Report, supra note 7. 
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Article XIV defense claimed by the United States, and found that the 
United States did sufficiently show that the federal statutes in question 
are “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order” and 
are justified as such because they are not applied arbitrarily or discrimi-
natorily.76 
To counter the finding of the Appellate Body that the U.S. measures 
are protected under Article XIV, Antigua raised a due process argument 
that the Panel should not have even considered the defense claimed by 
the United States because its delayed presentation of that defense de-
prived Antigua of “a full and fair opportunity to respond to the de-
fence.”77 However, based on Antigua’s comments at the appellate hear-
ing and Antigua’s failure to raise this objection to the Panel, the Appel-
late Body reasoned that Antigua was apparently aware that the United 
States might argue for exception under Article XIV and had an adequate 
opportunity to respond.78 The Appellate Body also considered arguments 
from both the United States and Antigua regarding accusations against 
the Panel for forming arguments and rebuttals in place of the parties 
whose responsibility it was to do so.79 The Appellate Body ruled that the 
Panel had not usurped the respective duties of the parties to present their 
own arguments and rebuttals.80 
                                                                                                             
 76. Key Facts and Summary, supra note 9. Because the Appellate Body already es-
tablished that Antigua failed to make a prima facie claim against the eight U.S. state laws 
in its dispute, the Appellate Body limited its review of the U.S. Article XIV defense to 
only the three federal laws that were found to be in violation of U.S. GATS Article XVI 
commitments. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 77. Id. (quoting Antigua’s other appellant’s submission, para. 73). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. Antigua accused the Panel of bearing the burden of the United States by con-
structing an Article XIV defense for the United States. Id. To support this claim, Antigua 
identified three public morals or public order concerns that the Panel raised on its own 
initiative: money laundering, fraud, and public health. The United States made a parallel 
contention that after it established a proper Article XIV defense for the three federal acts 
in question, the Panel improperly constructed a rebuttal under the Article XIV chapeau 
when Antigua itself failed to do so. Id. According to the Appellate Body, a panel may 
freely use the arguments submitted by the parties or develop its own legal reasoning to 
support its findings and conclusions, though it may not put forward evidence in support 
of a defense or rebut a claim. Id. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body easily dismissed Anti-
gua’s claim here because it found that the United States had in fact raised all of its public 
morals and public order concerns. Id. Also, as to the claim regarding the rebuttal under 
the chapeau, the Appellate Body found evidence that the United States had stated that its 
laws were applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion and that Antigua had contested this by 
stating the opposite. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Thus, the United States successfully justified its inconsistent measures 
under Article XIV(a) of the GATS through the Appellate Body’s finding 
that although the federal Wire Act, Travel Act, and Interstate Gambling 
Act violate U.S. commitments under the GATS, those measures are nec-
essary to protect public morals or maintain public order, and are not ap-
plied arbitrarily or discriminatorily.81 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE RULINGS OF THE WTO PANEL AND APPELLATE 
BODY REGARDING THE GATS ARTICLE XIV EXCEPTION 
A. Article XIV Analysis of the WTO Panel 
When evaluating the Article XIV exception, the Panel applied the two-
tiered analysis developed in other cases concerning Article XX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)82 to aid in interpreta-
tion since Article XIV had not been previously invoked.83 Reliance on 
Article XX of the GATT was based on the finding of “textual similarity 
between Article XX of the GATT of 1994 and Article XIV of the 
GATS” and “similar purposes that both Articles are designed to serve.”84 
According to this “two-tiered” approach, a measure must first fall within 
the scope of one of the recognized exceptions in order to enjoy provi-
sional justification, and second, must meet the requirements of the intro-
ductory provisions of the Article, the chapeau.85 There are two elements 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. 
 82. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreement on Trade 
in Goods, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]; General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 61 Stat. A3, A32 (1947) 
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
 83. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 84. Id. See also Caroline Bissett, Comment: All Bets are Off(line): Antigua’s Trouble 
in Virtual Paradise, 35 U. MIAMI INTER–AM. L. REV. 367, 397 (2004). Specifically, the 
Panel reviewed the Appellate Body’s findings in the following disputes: Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Appellate Body Report]; Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Appellate Body Report]; Appellate 
Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Beef Appellate Body 
Report]. 
 85. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. See also Hans-Joachim Priess & 
Christian Pitschas, Protection of Public Health and the Role of the Precautionary Princi-
ple Under WTO Law: A Trojan Horse Before Geneva’s Walls?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 
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necessary for the successful invocation of Article XIV(a): (1) the meas-
ure must be designed to “protect public morals” or to “maintain public 
order”; and (2) the measure must be “necessary” to serve this purpose.86 
Taking into consideration the sensitive nature of classifying “public mor-
als,” the Panel easily decided that the first of the above two elements 
may be satisfied by U.S. legislation against internet gambling.87 
Regarding the second element, the Panel used the “process of weighing 
and balancing a series of factors” developed by the Appellate Body in the 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef and EC—Asbestos disputes in order 
to determine necessity.88 This test assesses: 
(a) the importance of interests or values that the challenged measure is 
intended to protect…. 
(b) the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the reali-
zation of the end pursued by that measure…. [and] 
(c) the trade impact of the challenged measure.89 
The Panel found that the first part of the balance test was satisfied be-
cause the legislative history of the measures at issue showed that the so-
cietal interests served by the measures were “vital and important in the 
highest degree,” comparable to the interest in protecting human life and 
health against a life-threatening health risk in the asbestos dispute.90 The 
                                                                                                             
519, 536 (2000) (discussing the application of the “two-tiered approach” in article XX 
cases). 
 86. Priess & Pitschas, supra note 85. 
 87. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 88. Beef Appellate Body Report, supra note 84. See also Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body Report]. 
 89. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 90. Id. Specifically, the Panel recited comments made in 1961 by then Attorney Gen-
eral Robert F. Kennedy about the intended effect of the Wire Act and the Travel Act, that 
“profits from illegal gambling are huge and they are the primary source of the funds 
which finance organized crime, all throughout the country,” Testimony of Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Attorney 
General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4 
(1961), and the Congressional statement of findings prefatory to the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act: 
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, 
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s 
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corrup-
tion; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money 
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling…and other forms 
of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infil-
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second part of the balance test was also easily satisfied by the inherent 
prohibitions in the disputed measures.91 
In evaluating the third part of the balancing test, the Panel focused on 
the difference between the harms caused by the remote and non-remote 
supply of gambling because of its conclusion that “the United States does 
not prohibit outright the non-remote supply of gambling and betting ser-
vices.”92 The Panel found specific harms related to remote gambling, 
“namely the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling 
transactions combined with the offshore locations of most remote suppli-
ers and the virtual anonymity of such transactions.”93 These factors pur-
portedly facilitate use by minors, money laundering, fraud, and health 
problems related to the isolated environment of online gambling that pro-
tects gamblers from social stigma and allows them to gamble without 
interruption for extended periods of time.94 For these reasons, the Panel 
concluded that the application of U.S. laws towards domestic non-remote 
gambling operations was not discriminatory in relation to its prohibition 
of remote gambling services despite having a significant impact on 
trade.95 
However, to complete the evaluation of whether the measures in dis-
pute were “necessary,” the Panel reiterated that Members may only 
derogate their GATS obligations under Article XIV if they have “ex-
plored and exhausted reasonably available WTO-consistent alternatives” 
to those measures.96 Further, the Panel restated the finding of the Appel-
late Body in the U.S.—Malaysia shrimp dispute that although there may 
be situations where unilateral measures are justified under Article XX of 
                                                                                                             
trate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and cor-
rupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United 
States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent in-
vestors and competing organization, interfere with free competition, seriously 
burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and 
undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. 
Congressional Statement of Finding and Purpose, Note on 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970), p. 
812. 
 91. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. This approach is taken from a WTO Panel decision against the United States, 
which was not adopted, in its dispute against Mexico regarding tuna and dolphin protec-
tion measures under Article XX of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R–39S/155 (Sept. 3, 
1991) [hereinafter Tuna I Panel Report]. 
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the GATT of 1994, a multilateral approach is strongly preferred “as far 
as possible.”97 
It is at this key element regarding WTO-consistent alternatives that the 
United States failed to satisfy the standard put forth by the Panel for the 
invocation of the Article XIV exception. Addressing this critical issue, 
Antigua asserted that it had regulatory regimes in place to address the 
specific harms of remote gambling services.98 Antigua further claimed 
that it had offered to consult with the United States to meet any remain-
ing concerns notwithstanding its regulatory regime, but that it was repu-
diated by the United States even in its invitation to engage in interna-
tional cooperation to deal with the specific concerns of the United States 
regarding remote gambling and betting services.99 
The United States, on the other hand, countered that it had significant 
interactions with Antigua on law enforcement issues, but that it found it 
impossible to consider assistance from Antigua effective in curtailing 
illegal and harmful internet gambling operations.100 The United States 
also claimed that it was reluctant to work with Antigua after Antigua 
took a public position against the United States by filing an amicus-brief 
in support of Cohen, the aforementioned founder of the Antigua-based 
World Sports Exchange gambling site, to the Supreme Court.101 Further, 
the United States pointed out the inconsistency of expecting it to engage 
in international negotiations to establish a regime allowing the cross-
border supply of a service while no domestic regulatory regime exists 
permitting that service’s remote supply.102 
The Panel considered the argument of the United States, yet deter-
mined that it failed to pursue in good faith a course of action to explore 
the possibility of finding a reasonably available WTO-consistent alterna-
tive, and was therefore not protected by Article XIV.103 
B. Article XIV Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body 
In conducting a substantive review of the Article XIV defense claimed 
by the United States, the Appellate Body took the same approach as the 
Panel and relied on prior uses of the textually similar defense under Arti-
                                                                                                             
 97. Internet Gambling Panel Report, supra note 7 (quoting Shrimp Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 84). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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cle XX of the GATT.104 The Appellate Body also recognized the two-
tiered analysis the Panel used, to wit, that a measure must fall within the 
scope of one of the exceptions listed under Article XIV and that the 
measure must not be applied discriminatorily or arbitrarily.105 
After having upheld the Panel’s finding that the federal Wire Act, 
Travel Act, and Illegal Gambling Business Act were designed to protect 
public morals,106 the Appellate Body next considered whether the meas-
ures were “necessary” pursuant to Article XIV(a).107 On this issue, both 
the United States and Antigua raised arguments against the Panel’s rul-
ing.108 Antigua claimed that, as a finding of necessity requires a suffi-
cient nexus or degree of connection between the measure and the interest 
protected, the Panel failed to establish that nexus between gambling and 
the concerns raised by the United States.109 Also, Antigua argued that the 
Panel did not adequately discuss the “reasonably available alternatives” 
that Antigua had offered to counteract the concerns of the United States 
because the Panel limited its analysis to the realm of existing U.S. regu-
latory measures.110 
The United States argued against the Panel’s conclusion that the 
United States must have first explored and exhausted all reasonably 
available WTO-consistent alternatives before adopting an inconsistent 
measure, ostensibly by consulting with Antigua regarding the prohibition 
on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.111 In so do-
ing, the United States contended, the Panel erroneously imposed on it “a 
procedural requirement…to consult or negotiate with Antigua before the 
United States may take measures to protect public morals [or] protect 
public order.”112 The United States further argued that in previous dis-
                                                                                                             
 104. GATT, supra note 82, 33 I.L.M. at 1153, art. XX. This article, like Article XIV of 
the GATS, allows exceptions for measures that are, to name a few, 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health;…(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, includ-
ing those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies op-
erated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of pat-
ents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices. 
Id. 
 105. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting United States’ appellant’s submission). 
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putes, the availability of theoretical alternative measures did not preclude 
the Panel from deeming the challenged measures “necessary.”113 
According to the Appellate Body, a measure is “necessary” where it is 
relatively important, realizes the ends it pursues, and does not restric-
tively impact international commerce disproportionate to its importance, 
and where there are not reasonably available WTO-consistent alterna-
tives.114 An alternative would not be considered “reasonably available,” 
for example, if the responding Member cannot use it, if it imposes an 
undue burden on the Member, or if it does not provide the level of pro-
tection sought under Article XIV(a).115 
Notwithstanding the consideration of “necessity,” the Appellate Body 
followed the same reasoning as the Panel until making a crucial depar-
ture in deciding the issue of burden of proof. The Appellate Body sided 
with the United States, affirming that the party invoking a defense bears 
the burden of demonstrating that its violating measure satisfies the re-
quirements of the invoked defense,116 but holding that it is not the burden 
of the responding Member to identify WTO-consistent reasonably avail-
able alternative measures.117 According to the Appellate Body, after the 
responding Member has established a prima facie case for the use of a 
defense, the complaining party may raise valid alternative measures.118 
Subsequently the burden would shift back to the responding Member to 
respond in rebuttal that the alternatives are not legitimate.119 
The Appellate Body further disagreed with the focus of the Panel on 
whether the United States in good faith consulted with Antigua regarding 
WTO-consistent alternative measures because “consultations are by 
definition a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not 
capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case.”120 The 
Appellate Body firmly held that consultations should not be considered 
an alternative measure reasonably available to the United States.121 Also, 
because the emphasis placed by the Panel on the absence of consultations 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 88; Irene McConnell, The Asbestos 
Case at the World Trade Organization: The Treatment of Public Health Regulations 
Under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 153, 165–6 (2002); See also Beef Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 84. 
 116. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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showed that the Panel did in fact consider alternatives not currently in 
place in the United States, the Appellate Body dismissed the argument by 
Antigua that the review of the Panel was prohibitively limited.122 Addi-
tionally, since it decided that the responding party does not bear the bur-
den of identifying alternative measures, the Appellate Body rejected the 
contention by Antigua that the Panel should have continued an analysis 
into additional alternative measures that Antigua did not itself present.123  
Having found that the United States established a prima facie case of 
necessity and that Antigua did not provide a reasonably available alterna-
tive measure, the Appellate Body reversed the determination of the Panel 
that the failure of the United States to enter consultations with Antigua 
precluded a finding that the inconsistent federal measures were “neces-
sary” pursuant to Article XIV.124 The defense claimed by the United 
States therefore prevailed and Antigua’s victory was overturned. 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD FOR BURDEN OF PROOF 
IN PREVIOUS USES OF THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS PROVISION 
Many times, the successful invocation of a general exceptions provi-
sion, such as Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT, 
turns on the existence of any reasonable WTO-consistent alternative 
measure that nullifies a “necessity” requirement. Even where the invoked 
exception does not explicitly contain a “necessity” requirement, as in 
Article XX(g), the WTO has interpreted the chapeau as implicitly con-
taining it.125 Article XX, and specifically its “necessity” requirement, 
have consistently been narrowly interpreted by the Dispute Settlement 
Bodies of the WTO.126 Throughout cases involving the use of these de-
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. A responding party may claim protection under an exception that has a lower 
standard for the required nexus between the measure and its goal. A common example of 
such is GATT Article XX(g), which allows protection for measures “relating to the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources…” (emphasis added). GATT, supra note 82, 33 
I.L.M. at 1153, art. XX. In these cases, the WTO has nevertheless sought necessity within 
its second-tier analysis of the chapeau, when examining whether the measure was applied 
in an arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory manner. Arie Reich, Privately Subsidized 
Recycling Schemes and Their Potential Harm to the Environment of Developing Coun-
tries: Does International Trade Law Have a Solution?, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 242 
(2004). See also John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and 
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 126. Salmon Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinter-
preting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 69 (2001) (expanding on 
the scope and practice of Article XX). 
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fenses, the burden of proof has always been on the party invoking the 
exception to justify its WTO-inconsistent measure.127 A responding 
Member’s use of a general exceptions clause has been allowed only 
where it could establish its prima facie case for the use of the defense by 
proving that there were no WTO-consistent alternative measures avail-
able.128 Based on the rulings in these previous disputes, the use of the 
general exceptions clause by the United States does not pass muster. 
A. Thai Cigarette Dispute (1990)129 
In response to the claim by the United States that Thailand’s import re-
strictions on cigarettes violated the GATT Article XI:1,130 Thailand ar-
gued that its measures were justified under Article XX(b) for the protec-
tion of human life.131 The Panel found that the import restriction was in 
fact inconsistent with the GATT and then considered Thailand’s defense, 
ultimately concluding that the measure was not “necessary.”132 The Panel 
stated that Thailand’s import restrictions “could be considered ‘neces-
sary’…only if there were no alternative measures consistent with the 
General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade], or less inconsistent with it, 
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its 
                                                                                                             
 127. Padideh Ala’I, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO 
Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1129, 1137 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of meeting that burden in Arti-
cle XX cases). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Panel Report, Thailand—Restriction on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, DS10/R–37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Cigarette Panel Report]. The 
United States brought this dispute against Thailand for placing a prohibition on the im-
portation of cigarettes and other tobacco goods while authorizing the domestic sale of 
cigarettes. J.H.H. Weiler & Sungjoon Cho, International and Regional Trade Law: The 
Law of the World Trade Organization: Unit VIII: General Exceptions (2004), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/researchtools/wto/pdfs/WTO_ 2004_UnitVIII.pdf. 
 130. GATT 1947, supra note 82, 61 Stat. at A32, Art. XI. Article XI:1 reads, in perti-
nent part: “No prohibitions or restrictions…made effective through…import or export 
licenses…shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of 
any product of the territory of any other contracting party….” Id. 
 131. Weiler & Cho, supra note 129, at 8. To wit, Article XX(b) of GATT 1947 excepts 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” GATT 1947, supra 
note 82, 61 Stat. at A61, Art. XX. Thailand claimed that its import restriction was neces-
sary for this purpose because American cigarettes posed a greater health risk than its 
domestic brands: they contained unknown and potentially dangerous chemicals, were 
more addictive, and were milder tasting and thus more attractive. Cigarette Panel Report, 
supra note 129. 
 132. Weiler & Cho, supra note 129, at 8; see also Kruis, supra note 133, at 925. 
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health policy objectives.”133 Because the United States had suggested 
several alternatives to Thailand’s regulations, the Panel found that Thai-
land’s measures were not actually “necessary.”134 
This case set a high standard of review for WTO-inconsistent meas-
ures. In naming the suggested alternative measures, such as labeling and 
disclosure regulations, a ban on cigarette advertisements, or higher taxes 
for cigarettes, the Panel ignored whether these alternatives were politi-
cally or economically feasible to Thailand.135 However, in the internet 
gambling dispute at hand, the Appellate Body was relatively far more 
forgiving to the United States in evaluating its reasons for not pursuing 
alternative measures with Antigua. 
B. United States Tuna Dispute (1991)136 
Mexico brought a complaint against the United States for its dolphin-
friendly tuna importing restrictions.137 In response, the United States in-
voked GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) exceptions for its measures.138 The 
necessity test was applied to this case and the Panel stated that since the 
United States was invoking the defense, it had the burden of proving ne-
cessity.139 The Panel found that the United States had not satisfactorily 
pursued a consistent measure in that it did not try to negotiate any inter-
                                                                                                             
 133. Elizabeth E. Kruis, The United States Trade Embargo on Mexican Tuna: A Nec-
essary Conservationist Measure or an Unfair Trade Barrier?, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 903, 925 (1992) (quoting Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 129); see also 
Ala’I, supra note 127. 
 134. Kruis, supra note 133, at 925. According to Report, 
The United States considered that Thailand, like other contracting parties, could 
pursue the objective of seeking to prevent the increase in the number of smok-
ers without imposing a ban on imports. The experience of other countries had 
shown that decreases in the level of smoking resulted from diminished demand 
achieved through education and the recognition of the effects of smoking rather 
than restraints on the availability of cigarettes. 
Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 129. 
 135. Reich, supra note 125, at 243. 
 136. Laura Yavitz, The WTO and the Environment: The Shrimp Case That Created a 
New World Order, 16 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 203, 207 (2001–02). 
 137. Id. at 207. 
 138. Id. at 207. GATT 1947 Article XX(b) excepts measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health” and Article XX(g) excepts measures “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…” GATT 1947, supra note 82, 61 Stat. 
at A61, art. XX. 
 139. Kruis, supra note 133, at 925–6. 
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national cooperative arrangements for protecting dolphins.140 For this 
reason, the United States did not meet its burden and its Article XX de-
fense failed.141 Through this analysis, the Panel indirectly inserted the 
requirement that in order to satisfy “necessity,” the responding party 
must have exhausted all other options before imposing the measure.142 
In the internet gambling dispute, however, the Appellate Body held 
that the United States neither needed to exhaust, nor even name alterna-
tive measures.143 Thus, the holding of the Appellate Body in the internet 
gambling dispute that a complaining Member ought to raise valid alter-
native measures directly counters the Panel’s holding in the tuna dispute 
that a responding Member has the burden of proving necessity. Also, 
contrary to the holding of the Panel in the tuna dispute, the Appellate 
Body dismissed the requirement that the United States pursue interna-
tional cooperation, specifically with Antigua, because of the assertion by 
the United States that Antigua’s position was deleterious to the interests 
of the United States.144 Furthermore, the Appellate Body never suggested 
that the United States should have complied with the holding in the tuna 
dispute by attempting to initiate international agreements, even with the 
exclusion of Antigua, to support its concerns for public morals and pub-
lic order regarding the cross-border trade in gambling and betting ser-
vices.145 
C. United States Gasoline Dispute (1996)146 
In the gasoline dispute brought by Venezuela and Brazil, a United 
States measure was found in violation of GATT Article III,147 and the 
United States again used Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) defenses.148 
The Panel decided that under Article XX(b) the measure did involve pro-
                                                                                                             
 140. Yavitz, supra note 136, at 216. In its decision, the panel held that the Article XX 
exception clause “was intended to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive 
measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy 
goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable.” Tuna I Panel Report, 
supra note 96. 
 141. Yavitz, supra note 136, at 216. 
 142. Ala’I, supra note 127. 
 143. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 84. Brazil and Venezuela brought 
this dispute against the United States for a U.S. rule that regulated the gasoline that could 
be imported into the United States. Weiler & Cho, supra note 129. 
 147. GATT, supra note 82, 33 I.L.M. at 1153, art. III. Article III relates to national 
treatment. Id. 
 148. Weiler & Cho, supra note 129. 
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tection of human, animal, and plant life or health, however the defense 
again failed because it was not “necessary” since there were other WTO-
consistent, or less inconsistent, measures reasonably available to the 
United States.149 The Panel clearly noted that the burden fell to the 
United States to prove that its objectives precluded the effective use of 
measures that were WTO-consistent, or less inconsistent.150 
On appeal, the Appellate Body followed the standard approach of re-
quiring the responding Member to satisfy all the elements of the general 
exception it is invoking, including the chapeau requirements.151 Its deci-
sion held that the contravening measure fell within the terms Article 
XX(g) in that it related to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources, but that it did not satisfy the chapeau because the United States 
had not sufficiently explored means of mitigating the problem in coop-
eration with Venezuela and Brazil.152 In this way, the Appellate Body 
imposed an “exploration” requirement on a responding party in order to 
pass a necessity test. 
The exploration requirement posited by the Appellate Body in the 
gasoline dispute is incongruously similar to that which was disposed of 
by the Appellate Body in the internet gambling dispute. In the dispute 
over the internet gambling prohibitions of the United States, the Appel-
late Body claimed that the Panel erroneously focused on whether the 
United States attempted in good faith consultations with Antigua because 
consultations should not be considered an alternative measure reasonably 
available to the United States.153 However, the exploration requirement 
                                                                                                             
 149. Id. 
 150. Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
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177 (1997) (asserting that, “In upholding the view that parties seeking to rely on an ex-
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 152. Weiler & Cho, supra note 129. Specifically, the Appellate Body concluded that 
[T]he United States had not pursued the possibility of entering into cooperative 
arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had, not to 
the point where it encountered governments that were unwilling to cooperate. . 
. . [The record] does not reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the 
United states [sic] to enter into appropriate procedures in cooperation with the 
governments of Venezuela and Brazil. . . .  
Yavitz, supra note 136, at 219–20; See also Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory 
Policy and the WTO: How Constraining are Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 143, 178–
79 (2005). 
 153. Internet Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 8. 
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of the gasoline dispute, along with its reiteration that a responding Mem-
ber carries the onus of proof for the invocation of an exceptions clause, 
indeed suggest that the United States should have at least attempted con-
sultations with Antigua as a means of finding alternative measures. 
D. United States Shrimp Dispute (1998)154 
In the shrimp dispute, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a 
complaint against the United States and the Appellate Body held that 
U.S. measures were inconsistent with GATT Article XI.155 As in the 
gasoline dispute, the measure did fall under Article XX(g) according to 
the Appellate Body, but failed the necessity test imposed on it through 
the chapeau analysis.156 In this part of its review, the Appellate Body 
applied a necessity test to the “unjustifiable discrimination” clause of the 
chapeau.157 It held that failure to engage the exporting countries in nego-
tiations, or to attempt diplomacy before applying inconsistent measures, 
nullifies the use of a general exceptions defense.158 Specifically, recog-
nizing the need for international cooperation, the Appellate Body ex-
pressed that the failure of a responding party to seek alternate means 
through international agreement rendered the measure unjustifiable.159 
Once again, the ruling of the Appellate Body in the shrimp dispute, 
where it required a responding party to seek international cooperation to 
achieve the goals of its violating measure, directly contradicts its ruling 
in the internet gambling dispute.160 In the shrimp dispute, negotiations or 
diplomacy by the responding Member were mandatory elements to sat-
isfy a general exceptions clause, whereas in the internet gambling dis-
pute, lack of consultations with the complaining Member were regarded 
as insignificant. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Under the holding of the Appellate Body in the case against the United 
States for its measure prohibiting internet gambling services, it is the 
duty of the complaining party, not the responding party, to name alterna-
tives. Further, failure to consult with the complaining party about alterna-
tives cannot preclude the responding party from using a general excep-
tions defense because consultations are only the “process” of conceiving 
alternatives.161 This formula imprudently creates a disincentive for WTO 
Members to ever consider WTO-consistent alternatives. 
It is incumbent on the country invoking a general exceptions provision 
to prove that the measure at issue meets the standard for the “necessity” 
requirement in that provision.162 The responding country should bear the 
burden because its measure is in violation of an agreed term of trade, and 
this carries the presumption that the measure at issue is biased to the ad-
vantage of domestic producers. Therefore it is the duty of the regulating 
country to substantiate that its measure is necessary, that it has exhaus-
tively considered alternative options before adoption of that measure,163 
that the measure is the least trade-restrictive measure among other avail-
able alternative measures, or that there are no other reasonable WTO-
consistent measures that meet its policy goals. The responding party may 
even satisfy its burden by showing a “good faith effort” in negotiating 
WTO-consistent alternatives.164 
Although WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions do not create or 
rely on legally binding precedent, it has been the tradition of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Bodies to consider and apply interpretations and con-
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reach or seriously attempt to reach an environmental agreement. 
Id. 
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clusions from previous disputes.165 Thus, the Appellate Body should 
have drawn on its previous analyses and conclusions, and affirmed the 
decision of the Panel in Antigua’s dispute with the United States on its 
measures prohibiting the cross-border trade in gambling and betting ser-
vices. Applying the same standard for burden of proof in the GATS Arti-
cle XIV defense as in the GATT Article XX defense, Members should be 
required to thoroughly explore or consider WTO-consistent alternatives 
before implementing a measure that violates its GATS or GATT com-
mitments. Otherwise, the integrity of the international trading system and 
the efforts of the WTO to liberalize trade may be too easily undermined 
by protective policies and frivolous exceptions. 
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